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Elite science and the BBC: a 1950s contest
of ownership
ALLAN JONES*
Abstract. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the elite world of institutional British science
attempted to take control of the BBC’s management of science broadcasting. Delegations of
scientists met BBC managers to propose an increased role for scientists in planning science
broadcasts to a degree that threatened to compromise the BBC’s authority and autonomy. The
culmination was a set of proposals to the Pilkington Committee in 1960, principally from the
Royal Society and the British Association for the Advancement of Science, under which a
scientist-manager was to be appointed head of a uniﬁed science division in the BBC. BBC
managers resisted these proposals. The outcome, in 1964, was a compromise giving the
scientists little of what they wanted, and proving practically and strategically useful for the
BBC. The article frames the story as a contest of jurisdiction between elite science and the BBC,
and draws on scholarship relating to the social nature of authority and professions, and to the
popularization of science. It shows the fundamentally different beliefs held by the scientists and
the BBC about the purpose of science broadcasts and about the nature of the audience. The
historical narrative is based on unpublished archive documents, and it contributes to the small
but growing body of work on the historical background to the presentation of science in the
broadcast media.
In his 2008 book Films of Fact: A History of Science in Documentary Films and
Television, Timothy Boon observes, ‘Wherever science is put together with powerful
media of public communication, there is a potent conjunction, a nexus for the play of
social power.’1 That play of social power between science and a powerful public
medium, in this case the BBC, is central to this article, which examines in greater depth
some incidents that are only brieﬂy touched on in Boon’s book.
Between 1958 and 1963, a series of fractious interactions took place between British
scientists and the BBC over the management of science broadcasts. This article tells the
story of these interactions, and their eventual resolution in 1964. The story is largely
unknown, being contained in unpublished archive documents.2 At the heart of the
interactions was a belief among scientists that they ought to manage the BBC’s science
output. BBC managers rejected this suggestion, but eventually (and grudgingly) accepted
a compromise which, to their surprise, proved strategically useful.
* Department of Computing and Communications, Faculty of Mathematics, Computing and Technology,
Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK. Email: allan.jones@open.ac.uk.
The author wishes to thank the BBCWritten Archives Centre at Caversham, Reading, UK, for permission to
quote from BBC documents, and also the anonymous reviewers of an earlier version of this article.
1 Timothy Boon, Films of Fact: A History of Science in Documentary Films and Television, London:
Wallﬂower Press, 2008, p. 2.
2 Part of the story appears brieﬂy in Chapter 7 of Boon, op. cit. (1).
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I will examine these interactions in relation to the ideas of professionalism and
authority, both the authority of British scientiﬁc institutions and the authority of the
BBC. In particular, I will make use of Harry Collins’s observations on the distinctively
authoritarian character of ‘big science’ in the 1950s and 1960s, and on historian David
Edgerton’s observations on the rise of technocracy during the period covered by this
article.
To some extent the article addresses a gap in scholarship pointed out by Steven
Shapin, that ‘the roles of newspapers and magazines and of non-print media, notably
photography, radio, television, ﬁlm and museum exhibitions, in shaping (and
representing) public perceptions of science, technology and medicine also remain largely
unexplored’.3 Since Shapin published his observation, more than twenty years ago, a
number of scholarly works have appeared surveying, particularly, television science
coverage,4 but the organizational and historical context of science broadcasting has been
little explored. I suggest that in thinking about the way broadcast science is framed,
valuable insights are to be had from examining the organizational and cultural
backgrounds of the actors concerned. In this respect this article follows in the wake of
Timothy Boon’s Films of Fact, referred to above.
Before beginning my account of the interactions, I will look at the organization of
science broadcasts at the BBC, and say a little about the period in which the interactions
took place – approximately 1958–1963. This period coincides closely with what
historian David Edgerton refers to as the ‘technocratic moment’, a period when, in
Edgerton’s view, technocrats were in the ascendant in Britain.5 The historical narrative
will then follow in two parts. Between the two parts will come the major theoretical
ideas for my analysis.
The BBC and science
The BBC was created in 1922 as the British Broadcasting Company, and began radio
broadcasting in early 1923. It monopolized large-scale broadcasting in Britain until
the arrival of commercially funded television in 1955. The company’s ﬁrst man-
aging director, John Reith, espoused high ethical principles for the new medium.
3 Steven Shapin, ‘Science and the public’, in Robert C. Olby, Geoffrey N. Cantor, John R.R. Christie and
M. Jonathan S. Hodge (eds.), Companion to the History of Modern Science, London: Routledge, 1990,
pp. 990–1007, 1001.
4 See, for example, A.H. Tanner, ‘Agenda building, source selection, and health news at local television
stations’, Science Communication (2004) 25, pp. 350–363. Leon Bienvenido, ‘Science related information in
European television: a study of prime-time news’, Public Understanding of Science (2008) 17, pp. 443–460.
Toby Murcott, ‘Broadcasting science’, in Mark L. Brake and Emma Weitkamp (eds.), Introducing Science
Communication, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 105–127. Grace Reid, ‘The television drama-
documentary (dramadoc) as a form of science communication’, Public Understanding of Science (2012) 21,
pp. 984–1001. Markus Lehmkuhl, Christina Karamanidou, Tuomo Mörä, Kristina Petkova, Brian Trench
and AVSA-Team, ‘Scheduling science on television: a comparative analysis of the representations of science in
11 European countries’, Public Understanding of Science (2012) 21, pp. 1002–1018.
5 David Edgerton, ‘C.P. Snow as anti-historian of British science: revisiting the technocratic moment,
1959–1964’, History of Science (2005) 43, pp. 187–208.
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Programmes were to be ‘elevating as well as entertaining’.6 An ethos of self-conscious
paternalism pervaded the organization. In Reith’s words, ‘It is occasionally indicated
to us that we are apparently setting out to give the public what we think they need – and
not what they want, but few know what they want, and very few what they need.’7
For Reith, the BBC’s ability to provide a satisfactory public service was initially
compromised by its lack of formal autonomy and its commercial status. He lobbied for
the BBC to be converted to a public corporation – in British parlance, a self-governing,
state-owned enterprise. In 1927 the BBC became the British Broadcasting Corporation,
with Reith still at the helm but now as its ﬁrst director general. He remained in post until
his resignation in 1938.
By the late 1950s, when the scientiﬁc interventions discussed in this article occurred,
notions of public service had become more problematic for broadcasters than in Reith’s
day. According to Tom Burns, by the 1950s the BBC’s public-service aspect had become
‘a set of conventions’, by which Burns meant that, rather than being enshrined in a code
of practice, they were ‘diffusely embodied in everyday codes of social, cultural, economic
and political practice’.8 Public-service broadcasting, then, was largely what broadcasting
professionals believed it to be, or did. Broadcasters, though, were not unreﬂective about
public service. In an internal memorandum in 1956, a senior BBC manager advocated
the rejection of an attitude that many of us have grown up with, of having a mission to educate,
to up-lift, to lead people on to better things, to give them what we think they ought to want
rather than what they do want.9
This memorandum resulted not in a wholesale rejection of public-service ideals, but in a
juggling of existing radio networks to provide space for more popular programmes.10
My point is that the public-service concept, because formally undeﬁned, was open to
reinterpretation within the BBC as circumstances changed.
In one respect at least, the BBC of the 1950s still had much in common with the BBC
of Reith’s era in being coveted by outsiders with a cause to promote. Such outsiders often
sought to coopt the BBC for the furtherance of their cause. According to Burns, again
referring to the 1950s, the BBC saw itself as ‘perpetually beleaguered, under pressure,
being lobbied, or being compelled to lobby’.11 His observation is highly relevant to the
following story.
In the period covered by this article, no department in the BBC specialized in science.
With a couple of exceptions (Music and Religion), subject-speciﬁc departments of
the kind found in universities did not exist in the BBC. What distinguished BBC
production departments from each other was mode of presentation rather than
content. Thus among radio departments there were Talks, Features, Schools, Overseas
6 John Reith, Into the Wind, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1949, p. 299.
7 John Reith, Broadcast over Britain, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924, p. 34.
8 Tom Burns, The BBC: Public Institution and Private World, London: Macmillan, 1977, p. 122.
9 BBCWritten Archives Centre (hereafter WAC) R34/1022/2, untitled memo by R.d’AMarriott, July 1956,
quoted in Humphrey Carpenter, The Envy of the World, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1996, p. 167.
10 Carpenter, op. cit. (9), p. 170.
11 Burns op. cit. (8), p. 32.
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Broadcasts and News, and among television departments there were Television Talks
and Outside Broadcasts. These non-specialist departments produced many types of
broadcast, science included. The radio Talks department, however, was a prominent
producer of talks directed at the general radio listener. It is central to this narrative.
Although BBC departments were not subject-speciﬁc, some producers within them
were specialists. A leading radio producer of science talks throughout the 1950s was
Archibald Clow, a chemist and science historian. Clow was the only scientist among the
staff of thirty producers in the radio Talks department for much of the 1950s. However,
science programmes could also emerge from unlikely sources. Producer T.S. Gregory,
whose background was in theology, supervised several pioneering radio broadcasts in
the early 1950s on computers and artiﬁcial intelligence (as we would now term it).12 On
BBC television, the leading science producer in the second half of the 1950s and during
the 1960s was Aubrey Singer, who was not a scientist,13 and whose department, when
he embarked on scientiﬁc production, Outside Broadcasts, had no particular remit to
cover science.14 In 1960 one BBC manager judged that six departments were active in
science production – almost certainly an underestimate.15 This dispersed production of
the BBC’s science programmes was typical of the way many broadcasts were produced,
but was to become part of the package of complaints made by scientists about the BBC’s
science production.
Within the BBC’s dispersed production system, producers enjoyed a good deal of
autonomy, at least in planning programme content. Science producer Aubrey Singer
said, in a 1966 lecture, that ‘most ideas [for science programmes] come from
producers’,16 and producer Stuart Hood, who ﬁgures later in this story but not as a
science producer, conﬁrmed Singer’s description in 1967: ‘A producer is given full
powers in making a programme or a series of programmes. On him rests the ﬁnal
judgement of what is right and seemly to present to his audience.’17 On these accounts,
BBC producers enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. In this respect the BBC’s managerial
style could not be described as (to anticipate a term introduced later) ‘top-down’, at least
as far as programme production was concerned.
12 Allan Jones, ‘Five 1951 BBC broadcasts on automatic calculating machines’, IEEE Annals of the History
of Computing (2004) 26(2), pp. 3–15.
13 Philip Purser, ‘Aubrey Singer: controller of BBC2, head of radio and deputy director general of the
Corporation’, The Guardian, 28 May 2007, p. 28.
14 Boon, op. cit. (1), pp. 215–219.
15 BBC WAC R6/239/1, note from Harman Grisewood (chief assistant to the director general) to Board of
Managers, 20 October 1960. The sections and individuals listed by Grisewood were Archibald Clow’s unit in
Talks; Schools and Further Education science producers (of whom there were eleven, covering radio and
television schools broadcasts); James McCloy (senior science producer in Television Talks); Aubrey Singer in
Television Outside Broadcasts; B. Silcock in European Talks; the science correspondent in News. Grisewood
omitted to mention Nesta Pain and Isa Benzie, two producers with a long history at the BBC of producing
dramatic presentations relating to science, medicine and health, and the many producers in the BBC regions
who occasionally produced science broadcasts.
16 Aubrey Singer, Science Broadcasting, BBC lunchtime lectures, fourth series, October 1965–April 1966,
London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1966, pp. 12–13.
17 Stuart Hood, A Survey of Television, London: Heinemann, 1967, pp. 49–50, quoted in Burns, op. cit.
(8), p. 151.
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The broadcasting profession
Burns comments that broadcasting ‘seems to demand a kind of commitment which is
deeper and more binding and more complete than anything one encounters outside the
life and death professions’.18 This suggests that within its short history, broadcasting had
developed a strong professional ethos which deeply infused its practitioners. Professions
have received a good deal of attention from sociologists,19 and certain aspects of
professions can be seen to have been at play in the following narrative, not just in respect
of the BBC but also in respect of the British Association for the Advancement of Science
and the Royal Society, which, though not ofﬁcially professional organizations in the way
that, say, the British Medical Association is, had many attributes of professions.
One of the most important assets of a profession is its jurisdiction. This is the area of
activity over which it holds a monopoly, or aspires to hold a monopoly. To have
professional jurisdiction over a particular ﬁeld is to deny it to others: ‘one profession’s
jurisdiction preempts another’s’.20 To some extent, professions compete for jurisdic-
tions. As Andrew Abbott says, ‘jurisdictional boundaries are perpetually in dispute’.21
In the following narrative we see broadcasters and scientists disagreeing about whose
jurisdictional boundary should encompass science broadcasting.
Terrence Johnson observes that a characteristic of professions is their ability to impose
their own deﬁnition of the producer–client relationship,22 an instance of which can be
seen in the way professions retain the right to arbitrate on the performance of their own
work. This right is justiﬁed by the claim that only the profession is competent to evaluate
itself.23 When professions argue for more resources, they justify the argument by
reference to the public good, rather than to the beneﬁts that accrue to the profession.
Again, in the following narrative we see this played out as each side claims to serve the
public interest, and as the BBC comes to resolve the dispute on its own terms.24
The technocratic moment, 1959–1964
The period when the interventions happened, 1958–1963, corresponds closely to the
period which historian David Edgerton has referred to as the ‘technocratic moment’
(1959–1964). It was a period of increasing prominence for science and technology
in public life. Annual government spending on scientiﬁc research had grown from
under £10m in 1939 to £220m in 1955–6, and subsequently to £425m in 1964–1965.
18 Burns, op. cit. (8), p. 32.
19 See, for example, Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1988. Eliot Freidson, Professionalism Reborn: Theory, Prophecy and Policy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.
Terrence Johnson, Professions and Power, London: Macmillan, 1972. Keith Macdonald, The Sociology of the
Professions, London: Sage, 1995. Rolf Torstendahl and Michael Burrage (eds.), The Formation of Professions,
London: Sage, 1990.
20 Abbott, op. cit. (19), p. 87.
21 Abbott, op. cit. (19), p. 2.
22 Johnson, op. cit. (19), p. 43.
23 Freidson, op. cit. (19), p. 71.
24 Freidson, op. cit. (19), p. 70.
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Much of this spending was defence-related, and associated with Cold War politics.25
During the late 1940s, the number of scientists and engineers in higher education
doubled.26 Aside from government-funded scientiﬁc research, large research pro-
grammes were maintained by commercial companies in science-based industries, such
as ICI (chemicals); BP and Shell (oil); GEC, EMI and Plessey (electrical/electronics); and
Unilever (foods).27 ‘Big science’ was very much associated with the technocratic
moment.
Nevertheless, for many scientists and commentators, Britain was underperforming,
and this sense of inferiority was underlined by the launch of the Sputnik 1 artiﬁcial
satellite by the USSR on 4 October 1957 (followed a month later by the dog-carrying
Sputnik 2). These satellites were part of the USSR’s contribution to the International
Geophysical Year (IGY), which, unlike most years, lasted for eighteen months, from
1 July 1957 to 31 December 1958. Both of the main political parties in Britain pledged to
create a Ministry for Science in their 1959 election campaigns.28 Britain was not alone in
being chastened by the success of the sputniks. In the USA the launch of Sputnik 2 was
described as ‘a second Pearl Harbour’.29 In Britain, though, evidence of conspicuous
scientiﬁc and technological achievement abroad tended to play into notions of
‘declinism’ at home. Jim Tomlinson observes that in Britain in ‘the late 1950s and
early 1960s a new and quite speciﬁc notion of economic decline was born’, related to ‘the
perceived implications of poor economic performance for the welfare of the mass of
the populace’.30 The origin of British decline was widely seen to lie in idiosyncrasies
of British society, particularly in the alleged prominence in public administration (for
example, in the BBC) of privileged elites, and the absence of rational, analytical minds
and expertise.31 This frequently heard criticism has been termed the ‘technocratic
critique’ by David Edgerton.32 A celebrated example is C.P. Snow’s ‘Two cultures’
lecture, delivered at Cambridge University in 1959, in which Snow, in a long list of
grievances, lamented the dominance of humanities-trained personnel in public life, and
the dearth of scientists.33 However, according to Edgerton, the ‘technocratic moment’
was actually a period of technocratic ascendancy in Britain, when scientists’
pronouncements on issues of public policy were taken seriously.
To summarize, then, by the late 1950s, scientiﬁc research had expanded enormously
compared with even a decade before. ‘Big science’ had become dominant, and yet despite
25 Norman J. Vig, Science and Technology in British Politics, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968, p. 2.
Jon Agar, ‘Science and information technology’, in Jonathan Hollowell (ed.), Britain since 1945, Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing, 2003, pp. 347–364, 349.
26 Agar, op. cit. (25), p. 348.
27 Agar, op. cit. (25), p. 348.
28 Vig, op. cit. (25), pp. 30–31.
29 The Times, 4 November 1957, p. 10.
30 Jim Tomlinson, ‘Economic “decline” in post-war Britain’, in Paul Addison and Harriet Jones,
A Companion to Contemporary Britain 1939–2000, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005, pp. 164–179, 164.
31 Tomlinson, op. cit. (30), pp. 165–166.
32 Edgerton, op. cit. (5), p. 187.
33 Charles P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientiﬁc Revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1959.
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science’s apparently thriving health, there was a widespread anxiety that Britain was not
scientiﬁc enough, especially compared to certain other countries. Many scientists blamed
Britain’s decline on the disdain in which science was alleged to be held by public
administrators and policy makers.
Opening salvo
In August 1958, at the British Association for the Advancement of Science’s annual
meeting, the association’s president, industrial chemist Sir Alexander Fleck, mentioned
in his Presidential Address a number of contemporary scientiﬁc developments that he
considered indicative of the special importance of science and technology in
contemporary life: artiﬁcial satellites, thermonuclear fusion experiments at Harwell
and Aldermaston, rocketry, and the International Geophysical Year. He pointed out
society’s dependence on science, and, in particular, Britain’s economic dependence on
science and technology:
We must concentrate for our own survival on the development of new products and new
processes. We are obliged to rely either on selling things which no one else has yet learnt to
make, or make as cheaply, or on marketing our skill and know-how.34
Yet, he observed, where science and technology were concerned, ‘it is sad to think how
few people clearly understand what it is all about’.35
A few weeks after delivering this address, in September 1958, Fleck, together with two
other chemists, Sir Cyril Hinshelwood (president of the Royal Society and Nobel
laureate for Chemistry in 1956) and Sir Alexander Todd (chairman of the government’s
Advisory Council on Scientiﬁc Policy and Nobel laureate for Chemistry in 195736),
visited the director general of the BBC, Ian Jacob.
During the delegation’s visit to the BBC, it made what amounted to a technocratic
critique of BBC programming: there should be more science programmes, and they
should be more closely coordinated; that is, brought under some form of central
management ‘preferably at top policy-making level’, and organized systematically to
inculcate scientiﬁc understanding in the public. This was necessary because of the
public’s inadequate understanding of science’s importance:37 ‘They made it clear that
they were particularly concerned with the need to educate the mass of the public to
an understanding of scientiﬁc developments and of the vital role of science in the
contemporary world.’38
34 BBCWAC R6/239/1, paper from G.V. Allen, secretary of the British Association for the Advancement of
Science, 13 December 1960.
35 ‘Science and business: Sir Alexander Fleck’s case for partnership’, The Times, 28 August 1958, p. 9.
36 The British government’s Advisory Council on Scientiﬁc Policy was established in February 1947. Its
function was to advise the lord president of the council, who presided over meetings of the Privy Council.
‘Council on Scientiﬁc Policy’, The Times, 11 February 1947, p. 7. It was abolished in 1964.
37 BBC WAC M2/8/5, General Advisory Council paper GAC228, ‘Science Broadcasting’, 2 April 1959,
p. 3.
38 BBC WAC M2/8/5, General Advisory Council paper GAC228, ‘Science Broadcasting’, 2 April 1959,
p. 3.
Elite science and the BBC 707
Fleck, Hinshelwood and Todd’s visit to the BBC had no immediate effect. However, it
was the opening salvo of a ﬁve-year-long campaign by the elite scientiﬁc world
(principally the British Association for the Advancement of Science and the Royal
Society) to inﬂuence the BBC’s handling of science. Seven months after the Fleck–
Hinshelwood–Todd visit, in April 1959, Sir Hugh Linstead, a member of BBC’s General
Advisory Council (a body with no executive power, and comprising BBC staff and
distinguished outsiders), asked for a paper on science broadcasting to be presented at
the next General Advisory Council meeting.39 What particularly exercised Linstead were
(in his own words):
Scientiﬁc education
How to get over to the public the truth (apart from sensationalism) of recent scientiﬁc
discoveries and claims. Making the public conscious of the great scientiﬁc problems of our
times – Population and food; water and soil conservation; nuclear energy; inter-stellar
penetration and so on.40
The result of these interventions was the preparation by BBC staff of a seventeen-page
report, entitled ‘Science broadcasting’, presented to a meeting of the General Advisory
Council on 29 April 1959.41 The report largely defended the BBC’s existing
arrangements for science broadcasting. It set out the BBC’s aims regarding science
programming:
broadly, to demonstrate as clearly and arrestingly as possible what science is doing, how it
works – the application of scientiﬁc method to the solution of problems and the advancement
of knowledge – and the relevance of its work to people’s daily life and well-being.42
The BBC implicitly had no project to make the public more scientiﬁcally minded – if by
this we mean the instilling of scientiﬁc facts in the public’s mind. Rather, the purpose
of science broadcasts was to make the public better informed about science and
scientists. Satisfying this aim, according to the report, was constrained by practical
limitations. The range of science was vast in relation to the time that the BBC could
devote to it. Consequently, comprehensive coverage was impossible. Furthermore, some
areas of science were ‘too abstruse’ to be rendered intelligible to the layman, or were ‘so
specialised and remote from ordinary life as to be incapable of interesting him’. We see in
the above two very different conceptions of the role of science broadcasting held by
scientists and broadcasters. This difference was a recurring theme in the interactions, and
I shall say more about it later.
39 The General Advisory Council was one of several BBC advisory councils. Its membership, as with other
BBC advisory bodies, comprised BBC and non-BBC personnel, and meetings were held three or four times a
year to survey recent and forthcoming broadcasts. Advisory councils had no role in formulating programmes or
programme policy. The BBC is required by its charter to have such bodies.
40 BBC WAC M2/8/5, General Advisory Council paper GAC228, ‘Science Broadcasting’, 2 April 1959,
p. 1.
41 BBC WAC M2/8/5, General Advisory Council paper GAC228, ‘Science Broadcasting’, 2 April 1959.
42 BBC WAC M2/8/5, General Advisory Council paper GAC228, ‘Science Broadcasting’, 2 April 1959,
p. 1.
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The BBC paper commented that science found its way into many kinds of programme,
such as topical and magazine programmes and general talks, discussions and features.
This distribution of science across many types of programme, the paper implied, was
better served by the non-centralized production of science. The remainder of the ‘Science
broadcasting’ paper was given over to a lengthy survey of the many types of science
programming on the BBC.
Sir Solly Zuckerman pointed out at the General Advisory Council’s discussion that the
national effort in education was focusing increasingly on science, and wondered whether
broadcasting was playing its part. Several speakers mentioned the possibility of a science
‘curriculum’ for talks. For example, one speaker wanted to see a ‘planned curriculum of
broadcasts covering the ﬁelds of physiology, biology and physics’.43
Responding, the director general reiterated the BBC’s non-didactic conception of
public-service broadcasting. The task in relation to science broadcasting (outside Schools
and Educational Broadcasting) was ‘to interest the broad mass of the people constantly
in science and scientiﬁc development, so that they came to regard it as a natural part of
life’.44 He did not favour a curriculum for science output in general broadcasting:
Was it not better to avoid the suggestion, which a planned syllabus might tend to convey, that
you were trying to educate people? And would not such a syllabus demand an inordinate
amount of broadcasting time if it was to be covered properly?45
Regarding the suggestion that a senior BBC ofﬁcial should review the whole of the
corporation’s science broadcasting, the director general thought it impractical for one
person to undertake this.46 The meeting ended inconclusively.
This was not the end of the matter, and I shall resume the story later. Nor was 1958
the beginning, as the BBC had been lobbied by other scientists making similar points
in 1943–1944 and in 1949, although the scientists in 1958–1959 appear to have been
unaware of these earlier episodes.47 The interventions of the 1940s will not be discussed
here, except to record that the 1949 intervention led to the experimental appointment
of physiologist Sir Henry Dale as a BBC science coordinator from 1950 to 1952.
The experiment was judged unsuccessful by BBC managers, but Dale’s report shows
that it was jeopardized from the start by the BBC’s inadequate administrative
arrangements.48
43 BBC WAC R6/239/1, General Advisory Council Minutes of a meeting on 29 April 1959, Annexe on
‘Science Broadcasting’, p. 3.
44 BBC WAC R6/239/1, General Advisory Council Minutes of a meeting on 29 April 1959, Annexe on
‘Science Broadcasting’, p. 5.
45 BBC WAC R6/239/1, General Advisory Council Minutes of a meeting on 29 April 1959, Annexe on
‘Science Broadcasting’, p. 5.
46 BBC WAC R6/239/1, General Advisory Council Minutes of a meeting on 29 April 1959, Annexe on
‘Science Broadcasting’, p. 5.
47 Documents relating to the 1943–1944 interventions are mostly contained in BBC WAC R51/529.
Documents relating to the 1949 interventions are mostly contained in R6/34.
48 Allan Jones, ‘Clogging the machinery: the BBC’s experiment in science coordination, 1949–1953’,Media
History (forthcoming).
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I have now reached a natural pause in the story of the interventions of the late 1950s
and early 1960s. The story resumes a few months later, as I will discuss shortly.
However, this is a convenient point to take stock of the broad lines of the argument
presented by each side, and to introduce some theoretical concepts.
In the scientists’ view, the public was deﬁcient in scientiﬁc knowledge. Public-service
broadcasters had a responsibility to remedy this through a number of policy changes.
The BBC needed to highlight and promote science as part of a mission to make the
public more scientiﬁcally minded, and broadcasts needed to be more didactic. The
ultimate justiﬁcation for these policy changes lay in science’s economic and political
importance in the modern world, and in the public’s dependence on science. This is
very much the standard ‘public-understanding-of-science’ agenda, albeit with a strong
technocratic ﬂavour in tune with the times. This agenda has a long history and has
received much scholarly attention.49 It has been seen as in some degree self-serving,
and as buttressing the authority of science in public life. I will expand on this point
shortly.
As far as the BBC’s management was concerned, the best interests of the public were
served not by treating science specially, but by treating it like almost all other subjects.
The BBC did what it could for science, consistent with its need to be even-handed.
Deciding what was appropriate in the amount of science and its treatment was a matter
of professional broadcasting expertise rather than scientiﬁc expertise, although broad-
casters occasionally consulted scientists for advice.
These two attitudes represent the principal poles around which the debate revolved in
subsequent developments.
Scientiﬁc authority
In the foregoing narrative, scientists can be seen to have questioned the BBC’s authority
in the matter of science broadcasting, and the BBCmanagers can be seen to have asserted
their exclusive authority to serve public interest as they construed it. I wish therefore
to make a fairly long detour into the question of authority, in particular drawing
on Harry Collins’s coinage of the ‘top-down authority of 1950s science’, and on notions
of scientiﬁc authority expounded by chemist and philosopher of science Michael
Polanyi.
A dictionary deﬁnition of authority is ‘power to enforce obedience’.50 In relation to
scientiﬁc authority, however, scientists, in the exercise of their profession, seek not
so much obedience as recognition that their account of the natural world is correct,
or the best available. The ultimate currency of scientiﬁc authority is the orthodox
49 See, for example, Jane Gregory and Steve Miller, Science in Public, New York: Plenum, 1998; Jane
Gregory and Simon J. Lock, ‘The evolution of “public understanding of science”: public engagement as a tool
of science policy’, Sociology Compass (2008) 2(4), pp. 1252–1265. John Ziman, ‘Public understanding of
science’, Science, Technology and Human Values (1991) 16, pp. 99–105.
50 New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, revised 3rd edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
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scientiﬁc account of the natural world. However, as Barry Barnes and David Edge have
pointed out,
Scientiﬁc knowledge does not carry a revelation of its own correctness along with itself; rather
its standing is inevitably bound up with such contingent factors as the degree of trust and
authority possessed by its bearer, or by the institutions which sustain him and assert his
competence and legitimacy.51
That is to say, scientists’ accounts of the world are accepted not because of their self-
evident truth, but because scientists appear trustworthy and authoritative in cognitive
matters. This applies equally whether the consumers of scientiﬁc accounts are non-
scientists or scientists outside their own specialism. The maintenance of the scientiﬁc
jurisdiction, therefore, is achieved not through statute, as in the paradigmatic professions
of law and medicine (and indeed public-service broadcasting), but through continual
manifestation of scientiﬁc expertise in public. This observation takes us to a sociological
view of knowledge, in which what counts as knowledge becomes a matter of social
interaction, negotiation and agreement. As David Bloor says, ‘Knowledge has to be
gathered, organised, sustained, transmitted and distributed. These are all processes
visibly connected with established institutions . . . The mind will thus have registered on
some level a connection between knowledge and authority and power.’52 Popularization
is one way of manifesting expertise in public. Sergio Sismondo observes that without
popularization, science would be ‘a much more marginal intellectual activity than it is’.53
The presentation of science in popular media is therefore of great concern to scientists
for reasons that include its intimate connection with the maintenance of authority.54
Bruce Lewenstein notes that, in the USA, campaigns to increase the public understanding
of science in the post-war period have actually sought to increase the public appreciation
of, and support for, science, rather than public enlightenment,55 and Felicity Mellor
has observed that the ‘rhetoric of accessibility, and of the PUS [public-understanding-
of-science] movement more generally, serves to cover over the ways in which popular
science texts promote the interests of scientists by reinforcing their epistemic
authority’.56
51 Barry Barnes and David Edge, Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology of Science, Milton Keynes:
Open University Press, 1982, pp. 5–6.
52 David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2nd edn (ﬁrst edn 1976), Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1991, p. 53.
53 Sergio Sismondo, An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies, 2nd edn, Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 2010, p. 173.
54 See, for example, Massimiano Bucchi, ‘When scientists turn to the public: alternative routes in science
communication’, Public Understanding of Science (1996) 5, pp. 375–394. Christopher Dornan, ‘Some
problems of conceptualizing the issue of “science and the media”’, Critical Studies in Mass Communication
(1990) 7, p. 48–71. Jane Gregory, ‘Scientists communicating’, in Richard Holliman et al. (eds.), Practising
Science Communication in the Information Age, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 3–18. Sismondo,
op. cit. (53), p. 173.
55 Bruce V. Lewenstein, ‘The meaning of “public understanding of science” in the United States after World
War II’, Public Understanding of Science (2002) 1, pp. 46–68.
56 Felicity Mellor, ‘Between fact and ﬁction: demarcating science from non-science in popular physics
books’, Social Studies of Science (2003) 33, pp. 509–538, 530.
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Pierre Bourdieu argues that authority, like currency, is convertible: ‘Scientiﬁc
authority is thus a particular kind of capital, which can be accumulated, transmitted,
and even reconverted to other kinds of capital under certain conditions.’57
Scientists’ cognitive authority about the natural world therefore can be cashed as
authority about matters tangential to science, for example science policy, or indeed, I
suggest, science broadcasting. In connection with this extension of scientiﬁc authority
into social matters, Steve Fuller has written of ‘the pretension of certain élite scientists
who would like science to do more political work than is strictly warranted’.58 Here the
dictionary deﬁnition of authority as the power to enforce obedience becomes relevant, as
scientists’ deploy their epistemic authority outside the strictly scientiﬁc world in political
and policy interventions.
In a 2007 publication, Harry Collins commented on the distinctive character of
scientiﬁc policy interventions in the era of ‘big’ science. He referred to ‘the top-down
authority of 1950s science’.59 Although Collins offered little elaboration of the phrase,
inferences can reasonably be drawn about its meaning. Collins contrasted the top-down
authority of 1950s science with a more a recent development in which the public is
consulted on relevant scientiﬁc and technological issues. The consultative view has
displaced (in some quarters) a prior ‘deﬁcit model’ in which the public’s knowledge of
science was seen as inadequate, making the public ill-equipped to pass judgement on
scientiﬁc or technological policy matters.60 According to Collins, consultation with the
public (or other affected groups) amounts to a levelling down of the authority of
scientists, and lends political legitimacy to large-scale scientiﬁc and technological
projects. In an earlier publication, Collins and Evans comment that ‘in the 1950s
scientists were often attributed with authority to speak on subjects outside their narrow
area of specialization’.61 The ‘top-down authority of science’ therefore suggests a
strongly directive, even authoritarian, style of interaction by scientists in matters of
public policy in the 1950s.
Collins associated the ‘top-down’ approach with the scientiﬁc autonomy advocated
by Michael Polanyi in his 1962 paper ‘The republic of science’.62 In this paper, Polanyi
argued that ‘the pursuit of science by independent, self-coordinated initiatives assured
the most efﬁcient possible organization of scientiﬁc progress’.63 According to Polanyi,
scientists should be free to pursue their own lines of enquiry, with no ulterior purpose,
57 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The speciﬁcity of the scientiﬁc ﬁeld and the social conditions of the progress of reason’
(abridged 1998, ﬁrst published 1975), in Mario Biagioli (ed.), The Science Studies Reader, London: Routledge,
1999, pp. 31–50, 34.
58 Steve Fuller, The Philosophy of Science and Technology Studies, London: Routledge, 2006, p. 16.
59 Harry Collins, Chapter 4 of Jan-Kyrre Berg Olsen and Evan Selinger (eds.), Philosophy of Technology:
5 Questions, New York: Automatic Press, 2007, p. 31–43.
60 Gregory and Lock, op. cit. (49).
61 Harry Collins and Robert Evans, ‘The third wave of science studies: studies of expertise and experience’,
Social Studies of Science (2002) 32, pp. 235–296, 259.
62 Collins, op. cit. (59), p. 37.
63 Michael Polanyi, ‘The republic of science: its political and economic theory’, Minerva (1962) 1,
pp. 54–74, 56.
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such as remedying social or economic problems.64 Such a ‘scientiﬁc republic’, according
to Polanyi, had an efﬁcient and self-organizing character, analogous to the operation of
commercial markets.65 The scientiﬁc republic also exempliﬁed the most desirable form
of social organization: ‘For in the free cooperation of independent scientists we shall ﬁnd
a highly simpliﬁed model of a free society’.66
Mary Jo Nye sees in Polanyi’s advocacy of untrammelled scientiﬁc enquiry an
idealization of the research environment he enjoyed in Berlin from 1920 to 1933 among
‘a tightly networked community of world-class colleagues within the tree-lined precincts
of Dahlem’.67 Polanyi’s thirteen-year Berlin idyll was rudely interrupted by the rise of
Nazism and his departure for the UK. For Polanyi, the subsequent state manipulation of
science in Germany was symptomatic of the Nazi regime’s illiberality and its politically
expedient notion of truth, through which science was coopted to political ends. Polanyi
held similar views about the USSR.68 Following his move Manchester University’s
chemistry department in the 1930s, Polanyi opposed the social-relations-of-science
movement, a growing force in British science at the time, which held that scientiﬁc
research should be oriented towards socially beneﬁcial ends.
In Polanyi’s scientiﬁc republic, the success or failure of scientists was assessed only by
other scientists. Mary Jo Nye summarizes this: ‘only wise scientists can interpret the
difference between good science and bad science or pseudoscience’.69 Polanyi acknow-
ledged that this was different from the position of, for example, judges, generals and
business people, whose merit could be assessed by non-specialists.70 In the scientiﬁc
republic, the criteria that scientists were expected to use when verifying their accounts of
the world were not stated explicitly – unlike, for example, in Popperian falsiﬁcation – but
were acquired within the profession through acculturation. The public, though excluded
from the republic of science, was, according to Polanyi, subject to its statutes: ‘the body
of scientists, as a whole, [upholds] the authority of science over the lay public’. Indeed,
‘the whole outlook of man on the universe is conditioned by an implicit recognition of
the authority of scientiﬁc opinion’.71 Polanyi thus saw the autonomy of science as
underwriting its authority, and its authority as extending from the community of
scientists into the wider population. Lakatos characterizes this view as ‘elitist
authoritarianism’72 and describes it as ‘the standard view institutionalized today in
scientiﬁc organizations such as the Royal Society’.73 His use of the term
64 Polanyi, op. cit. (63), pp. 57–59.
65 Polanyi, op. cit. (63), p. 55.
66 Polanyi, op. cit. (63), p. 54.
67 Mary Jo Nye, Michael Polanyi and His Generation: Origins of the Social Construction of Science,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011, p. 83.
68 Michael Polanyi, ‘The autonomy of science’, Scientiﬁc Monthly (1945) 60, pp. 141–150, 147–149.
69 Nye, op. cit. (67), p. 255.
70 Polanyi, op. cit. (63), p. 141.
71 Polanyi, op. cit. (63), p. 60.
72 Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, For and against Method: Including Lakatos’s Lectures on Scientiﬁc
Method and the Lakatos–Feyerabend Correspondence, ed. Matteo Motterlini, Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1999, p. 27.
73 Lakatos and Feyerabend, op. cit. (72), p. 28.
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‘institutionalized’ is especially signiﬁcant in view of the role of scientiﬁc institutions,
including the Royal Society, in the events narrated here.
Steve Fuller suggests that autonomy and elitist authoritarianism have characterized
much scientiﬁc policy making in the post-war period:
Western national science policy makers . . . since the end of World War II, have presumed that
self-organising bodies of scientists, roughly corresponding to academic disciplines, can
determine the best researchers and research, and need change course only when they see ﬁt.74
Lengwiler makes much the same point, referring to the period between 1945 and the
early 1970s as one in which science was granted ‘wide autonomies of self-regulation
in terms of the division and use of funding as well as the instruments of quality
assessment’.75
Polanyi, and later commentators on him such as Lakatos and Collins, give us a
striking image of an autonomous scientiﬁc republic which is largely self-regulating,
at least in epistemic matters, and to which the public is subject. It would, however,
be wrong to make too much of Polanyi as an actor in the present context. He did not
take part in the interactions between scientists and the BBC, and his name was not cited
by any of the participants. However, Cyril Hinshelwood and Alexander Todd, two
members of the trio that called on the BBC’s director general in September 1958
(as described above), knew him and shared some of his views on science and society.
Hinshelwood and Polanyi met at a meeting of the American Chemical Society in 1926 in
Minnesota, though whether this was their ﬁrst meeting is not clear.76 Subsequently,
in 1941, Hinshelwood supported Polanyi in taking exception to an article by Richard
Gregory, the editor of Nature, which advised against attaching ‘particular holiness to
scientiﬁc truth’.77 Alexander Todd came into close contact with Polanyi in 1938 on
accepting a chair in organic chemistry at Manchester University, where Polanyi lectured.
The two men bonded, and Todd agreed with Polanyi’s ‘anti-socialist views on the
freedom of science from state interference’.78
Pilkington
I now resume the story of the scientiﬁc interventions at the BBC. The next wave of
interventions came in 1960–1961, and was associated with the Pilkington Committee.
This was one of numerous review committees that have punctuated the history of British
broadcasting. The charters of the BBC and of the ‘independent’ (that is, commercially
funded) terrestrial broadcasters do not grant them perpetual existence. Instead, charters
74 Steve Fuller, Kuhn vs Popper: The Struggle for the Soul of Science, Cambridge: Icon, 2003, p. 46.
75 Martin Lengwiler, ‘Participatory approaches in science and technology: historical origins and current
practices in critical perspective’, Science, Technology, and Human Values (2008) 33, pp. 186–200, 193.
76 Nye, op. cit. (67), p. 115.
77 Nye, op. cit. (67), p. 204.
78 William H. Brock, ‘Todd, Alexander Robertus, Baron Todd (1907–1997)’, Oxford Dictionary of
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004, available at www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/64697,
accessed 9 January 2012.
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have a ﬁxed term of, generally, ten to ﬁfteen years, and renewal of the charter beyond
that term is subject to review by a specially constituted committee. The Pilkington
Committee, created in July 1960, was such a committee.
The context of the Pilkington Committee’s creation was one of moral panic over the
state of commercial television.79 Advertisement-funded television had begun in Britain in
1955, and had become highly proﬁtable through popular quiz shows such as Double
Your Money, Take Your Pick and Beat the Clock. These shows had attracted much
opprobrium because the extravagance of their prizes was considered disproportionate to
the intellect needed to win them. Critics could be found in all parts of the political
spectrum, not least in the Conservative administration, which had inaugurated
commercial television.80 The Pilkington Committee, which the Conservative govern-
ment set up, was, through the choice of members, skewed strongly towards a
retrenchment of public-service values, and away from a rampantly commercial and
unregulated model.81
One issue that the Pilkington committee was expected to advise on was the allocation
of a third national television channel.82 At the time of the committee’s formation, British
viewers had a choice of only a single national BBC channel and an ITV channel serving
the viewer’s region. ITV, or Independent Television, was an afﬁliation of regionally
based commercial channels which sometimes broadcast regional content, and sometimes
a single national programme. It was administered by the ITA, or Independent Television
Authority.
The Pilkington Committee was the ﬁrst charter review committee to receive
submissions on science broadcasting. Four were received, from the Royal Society, the
British Association for the Advancement of Science, the Department of Scientiﬁc and
Industrial Research (DSIR) and crystallographer Kathleen Lonsdale (vice president of
the Royal Society and general secretary of the British Association for the Advancement
of Science). Elite science was therefore the majority voice in the submissions. All the
submissions overlapped considerably. In addition, the Royal Society’s submission
reiterated the points made by the Fleck–Hinshelwood–Todd deputation to the BBC in
1958, and indeed Fleck was one of the four authors of the Royal Society’s submission.83
Table 1 summarizes the proposals made in the submissions and who made them. The
proposal at the top of Table 1, the appointment of a scientist to a high managerial
position at the BBC to take responsibility for all science broadcasts, was the only one to
appear in all four submissions.
79 Jeffrey Milland, ‘Courting Malvolio: the background to the Pilkington Committee on Broadcasting,
1960–62’, Contemporary British History (2004) 18, pp. 76–102, 79.
80 Milland, op. cit. (79), p. 88.
81 Milland, op. cit. (79), p. 95.
82 Milland, op. cit. (79), p. 78.
83 BBC WAC R6/239/1, letter, 15 October 1962, from D.C. Martin (executive secretary of the Royal
Society) to R.d’A.Marriott, assistant director of sound broadcasting. Also R6/239/1, memo from head of Talks
(Sound) to ADSB, 14 September 1962. This memo names the authors of the Royal Society’s submission as
Sir Harrie Massey, Lord Fleck, Professor C.A. Waddington and Professor M. Abercrombie.
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The Pilkington Committee’s report was published towards the end of June 1962.84
In addition to recommending the renewal of the BBC charter and the BBC’s licence-fee
funding, the report recommended awarding an additional television channel to the
BBC rather than ITV, and a wholesale restructuring of commercial television (which
subsequently was only partly implemented). The new television channel, BBC2, was
launched in April 1964. Concerning science broadcasting, two paragraphs of the report
mentioned the scientiﬁc submissions, and asked the broadcasters to reconsider them.85
Referring the science submissions back to the BBC was a crucial move. The Pilkington
Committee’s major recommendations (summarized above) were directed at Parliament,
where they entered the arena of national policy making. Asking the broadcasters to
reconsider the scientiﬁc submissions framed the issue of science broadcasting as a matter
of professional judgement, a move consistent with the pro-public-service orientation of
the committee.
The task of reconsidering the scientiﬁc submissions fell to R.d’A. Marriott, assistant
director of sound broadcasting, and Stuart Hood, controller of programmes, television.
The director general acknowledged that resolving the issue might require a concession:
‘one of the prices we might have to pay for a satisfactory settlement would be to arrange
for some kind of a meeting of a committee of scientists, preferably of an informal and
irregular nature’.86
In acknowledging the possibility of a concession, the director general indicated a
solution that would be acceptable to the BBC. What the scientists actually sought – that
Table 1. Proposals in scientiﬁc submissions to the Pilkington Committee
Proposal Proposers
Appointment of a scientist to the BBC who would operate at policy and
planning level within the BBC and be responsible for all science
broadcasts
Royal Society, British Association,
Lonsdale, DSIR
Expansion of science broadcasting Royal Society, Lonsdale, DSIR
More scientiﬁc production staff at BBC and ITA (Independent
Television Authority)
DSIR, Lonsdale
Science advisory council to advise the BBC Royal Society, British Association
Non-formal committee of scientiﬁc advisers DSIR
Greater coordination of science broadcasting Royal Society, Lonsdale
Third, non-specialist, television channel DSIR, Royal Society
Third television channel specializing in ‘serious’ output British Association
More broadcasting on technology DSIR
Conversion of some broadcasting studios to laboratories Lonsdale
Formulation of a policy on science broadcasting British Association
Research into science presentation British Association
84 William H. Pilkington, Report of the Committee on Broadcasting, London: HMSO, 1962. The ‘H’ in
Pilkington’s name stood for Henry, but he was generally known as ‘Harry’.
85 Pilkington, op. cit. (84). The two paragraphs about science broadcasting are paragraphs 325 and 326.
86 BBC WAC R6/239, memo from assistant director of sound broadcasting (R.d’A Marriott) to head of
Talks (Sound), 9 August 1962.
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the BBC take as a mission the reorientation of society towards science, with a scientist in
charge –was implicitly excluded. The director general’s preference for the committee to
be ‘informal’ and to meet ‘irregularly’ suggests a wish to circumscribe its inﬂuence. The
BBC’s already existing advisory councils were both formal and regular.
Marriott and Hood met representatives of the Royal Society, the British Association
for the Advancement of Science and the BBC on 12 December 1962.87 The scientists
stressed that they were not critical of the content of science programmes produced
by the BBC. The problem was managerial: an insufﬁciency of science broadcasts, given
the importance of science, and a lack of overall policy in science programming.88
In response, BBC representatives cited their own professional competence in programme
planning as bases for the existing arrangements, explaining that the ‘total balance of
programmes was based on the process of long experience’.
Sir Eric Ashby (president of the British Association for the Advancement of Science)
compared unfavourably the range of topics dealt with in Science Survey (a weekly radio
magazine programme) with the systematic planned and ‘articulated’ teaching given in
language lessons.89 The BBC representatives pointed out that there was a distinction
between programmes intended for the general public and educational series, which were
presented by Schools and Further Education for a different type of audience. This
distinction was one the scientists were reluctant to accept.90
Sir Harrie Massey (a mathematical physicist, and one of the four authors of the Royal
Society’s submission) objected to the Third Programme’s presentation of scientiﬁc
controversy: ‘Third Programme science broadcasts dealt only with those speculative
areas where scientists themselves were in dispute or where the validity of certain scientiﬁc
concepts could be challenged, instead of informing people about the more important
practical scientiﬁc achievements.’91 Massey here did not take account of the probing,
critical function of the Third Programme, which was a more intellectually oriented
service than the other BBC radio networks, and implied that the BBC had a duty to
promote orthodox science, and not to reveal internal scientiﬁc disputes.
The scientiﬁc representatives reiterated their Pilkington recommendations for a
scientist at senior managerial level within the BBC, and a scientiﬁc advisory committee.92
BBC representatives pointed out that any such scientiﬁc manager would be ineffective
unless invested with powers held by BBC staff. This, they said, was not practical.93
87 BBC WAC R6/239/1, notes of a meeting held at Burlington House, 12 December 1962.
88 BBCWACR6/239/1, notes of a meeting held at Burlington House, 12 December 1962. The scientists had
calculated (from BBC data) that about 5 per cent of radio and 6 per cent of television output were devoted to
science.
89 BBC WAC R6/239/1, notes of a meeting held at Burlington House, 12 December 1962.
90 BBC WAC R6/239/1, notes of a meeting held at Burlington House, 12 December 1962.
91 BBC WAC R6/239/1, notes of a meeting held at Burlington House, 12 December 1962.
92 BBC WAC R6/239/1, notes of a meeting held at Burlington House, 12 December 1962.
93 BBC representatives pointed out that a single high-level scientist could not oversee both radio and
television broadcasts. A practical implementation of the scientists’ proposal would require two high-level
scientists, one for radio and the other for television. Parallel managerial posts for radio and television were
usual in the BBC at this time.
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BBC representatives left optimistic that citing their professional experience had swayed
the meeting:
Although we could not give the BBC’s ﬁnal answer, we left them in no doubt that in the opinion
of the four of us, from our practical knowledge of broadcasting, their proposition was not a
viable one. At the end of the discussion, Lord Fleck insisted that they would not yield on their
claim but this was said in a partly jocular tone and it seems likely that we have made a
considerable dent in their conﬁdence.94
Regarding the proposal for a scientiﬁc advisory committee, there was a possibility for
compromise:
We made it clear that we regarded this proposal [a scientiﬁc advisory committee] as being of a
different order from the proposal for a senior science post in that it was certainly not
impracticable. We had no objection in principle to the formation of a Committee; our only
concern was that if it were to exist it should be useful and should help in the making of good
science programmes, and we thought that the BBC would prefer to avoid creating another
formally constituted advisory committee.95
The favoured solution, then, was one which was most consonant with existing BBC
professional practice. Marriott and Hood’s report for BBC management did not accept
that science was special, or owed special consideration – the scientists ‘are specialists
arguing for their own subject, and most specialists believe that their own subject is under
represented’.96 Regarding lack of coordination of science broadcasts, again there was no
reason to treat science differently from any other subject:
Nor is there [coordination] for literature, history, art, drama, sport or any other subject. It
seems to us that to demand that there should be is to ignore the nature of a general broadcasting
service, to treat it as if it were an educational institution, and to seek to apply to the whole of
such a service criteria which are relevant only to sections of it, such as Schools Broadcasts or
Further Education.97
The appointment of a high-level scientist, or of scientists, to coordinate broadcasts was
asserted to be unacceptable. It would infringe existing managerial arrangements, which
were taken as given:
[The creation of these posts is] wholly impracticable and should be ﬁrmly resisted. Even if the
criticisms were accepted and our aim were to increase the time allotted to sound [sic: science?]
and to formulate a science policy the existence of such posts would do nothing to help towards
this end, and they could only really function by taking over responsibilities from those who
must necessarily be senior to them.98
94 BBC WAC R6/239, notes of a meeting held at Burlington House, 12 December 1962.
95 BBC WAC R6/239, notes of a meeting held at Burlington House, 12 December 1962.
96 BBC WAC R1/99/1, Board of Governors Papers 1963, 1–20, R.d’A. Marriott and S. Hood, ‘Science
Broadcasting’, 14 January 1963.
97 BBC WAC R1/99/1, Board of Governors Papers 1963, 1–20, R.d’A. Marriott and S. Hood, ‘Science
Broadcasting’, 14 January 1963.
98 BBC WAC R1/99/1, Board of Governors Papers 1963, 1–20, R.d’A. Marriott and S. Hood, ‘Science
Broadcasting’, 14 January 1963.
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The idea of an advisory committee, however, was at least workable: ‘The suggestion of
an advisory committee is . . . not impracticable. We doubt whether it will greatly assist in
the planning and production of better programmes but we think it not unreasonable to
give it a fair trial.’99 The director general accepted the implications of Hood and
Marriott’s report, and an advisory committee, under the name of the Science
Consultative Group, was established, initially for an experimental period of two
years.100 Its ﬁrst meeting was held on 29 May 1964.
The Science Consultative Group
The ﬁrst chairman of the Science Consultative Group was Professor Alex Haddow, a
leading cancer researcher, and the ﬁrst cohort of members included Sir Lawrence Bragg,
Professor Herman Bondi, Professor D.V. Glass, Dr J.C. Kendrew, Sir Patrick Linstead
(brother of Hugh Linstead, mentioned earlier), Professor M.M. Swann, and Mr Hugh
Tett.101 The British Association, Royal Society and DSIR were invited to nominate
members.102 This differed from normal practice with BBC advisory councils, where
members were selected by the BBC.103 None of the scientists directly connected with the
Pilkington submissions was among the membership of the group.
After the group had been operating for two years, a report was produced by BBC staff
for BBC management. Its ﬁndings were surprising. Whereas managers had expected the
group to infringe the BBC’s autonomy and to lower professional standards,104 the reality
was quite different: the group ‘has caused us no difﬁculties (except for a little extra work
for our science staff)’;105 ‘Such criticisms as [the scientists] have made have been
reasonable’;106 ‘they have been friendly and individually helpful’;107 ‘Hugh Tett was
99 BBC WAC R1/99/1, Board of Governors Papers 1963, 1–20, R.d’A. Marriott and S. Hood, ‘Science
Broadcasting’, 14 January 1963.
100 BBC WAC R6/239/3, memo from R.D. Pendlebury to BBC heads and controllers, 1 October 1965.
101 BBC WAC R6/239/1, Board of Governors Papers 50–69, G.67/64. The afﬁliations of the members of
the group were as follows. Haddow was director of the Chester Beatty Research Institute; Bragg was director
of the Royal Institution; Bondi was professor of applied mathematics at King’s College London; Glass was in
the Department of Sociology at the London School of Economics; Kendrew was on the Medical Research
Council (he shared the Nobel Prize for chemistry in 1962 with Max Perutz); Linstead was rector of Imperial
College of Science and Technology; Swann was in the Department of Zoology at Edinburgh University;
Tett was chairman of Esso Petroleum.
102 BBC WAC R6/239/3, memo from R.D. Pendlebury (secretary of the Consultative Group) to D. Tel,
D.B.B, 9 November 1965.
103 Burton Paulu, Television and Radio in the United Kingdom, London: Macmillan, 1981, p. 140. In the
context of advisory councils and committees, Paulu writes of the National Councils for Wales, Scotland
and Northern Ireland, for which members are selected ‘not directly by the BBC, as are all other council and
committee members’.
104 BBC WAC R6/239/3, memo from head of Talks and Current Affairs to programme editor, Arts, Sci &
Docs(s): editor, Science Talks(s), October 1965.
105 BBC WAC R6/239/3, memo from assistant director of sound broadcasting to director of sound
broadcasting, 11 October 1965.
106 BBC WAC R6/239/3, memo from head of Talks and Current Affairs to programme editor, Arts, Sci &
Docs(s): editor, Science Talks(s), October 1965.
107 BBC WAC R6/239/3, memo from head of Talks and Current Affairs to programme editor, Arts, Sci &
Docs(s): editor, Science Talks(s), October 1965.
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kind enough to read and comment upon Leon Bagrit’s Reith Lectures in a personal
capacity. Michael Swann has been helpful in advice, consultation and as a
contributor.’108
Far from resenting the group’s existence, BBC managers urged its continuation: ‘To
dissolve the group at this stage might well create ill will and harm the much improved
ofﬁcial relations – as distinct from the private ones, which have always been good.’109
Among its other beneﬁts, the Science Consultative Group insured against a repetition
of recent events: ‘its existence will almost certainly prevent the Pilkington criticisms
being repeated’.110
The Science Consultative Group thus became established. The term of membership
was ﬁxed at four years. Although the name of the group remained ‘Science Consultative
Group’, it embraced both science and technology, and this hybrid remit was represented
in its membership.111 It continued to meet for three decades. During 1994 it was
disbanded, possibly by John Birt, the director general from 1992 to 2000, known for his
reforming zeal.112
Discussion and conclusion
I have proposed that the interactions between scientists and the BBC be seen as
competitions for jurisdiction over science broadcasting, in which each side sought to
assert its authority over the other. I have also drawn on the notion of the ‘top-down
authority’ of 1950s science, from the work of Harry Collins and other thinkers, which
refers to an authoritarian style of interaction by scientists towards non-scientists on
matters of policy in a technocratic era of ‘big science’. In the story told here scientists
attempted to exercise ‘top-down’ authority in three distinct domains: the inter-
institutional domain, the intra-institutional domain and the public domain. I will
brieﬂy expand on this observation.
By the inter-institutional domain I mean the domain in which one institution interacts
with another over matters of institutional jurisdiction. In the present example, high-level
members of elite scientiﬁc institutions interacted with high-level managers of the BBC in
order to change its policy in science broadcasting, and indeed to transfer responsibility
for these broadcasts to scientists.
108 BBC WAC R6/239/3, memo from head of Talks and Current Affairs to programme editor, Arts, Sci &
Docs(s): editor, Science Talks(s), October 1965.
109 BBC WAC R6/239/3, memo from head of Talks and Current Affairs to programme editor, Arts, Sci &
Docs(s): editor, Science Talks(s), October 1965.
110 BBC WAC R6/239/3, memo from assistant director of sound broadcasting to director of sound
broadcasting, 11 October 1965.
111 BBC WAC R6/239/3, memos from R. Pendlebury, 22 April 1966 and 24 October 1966, and from
director of sound broadcasting, 2 November 1966.
112 A news story by journalist Jonathan Margolis (‘Heretics’, Sunday Times, 3 July 1994) quotes Lewis
Wolpert (a member of the Consultative Group) as saying that he tried to have the television seriesHeretics (on
heretical living scientists such as Rupert Sheldrake) stopped, ‘but then that committee was disbanded’.
A personal communication from former BBC science producer Martin Redfern, 29 April 2008, suggests that
John Birt may have been instrumental in disbanding the group.
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In contrast with the inter-institutional domain, the intra-institutional domain relates
to the inner workings of (in this case) the BBC. The scientists intended that a scientist-
manager be installed in the BBC to plan broadcasts, supervise producers and raise the
status of science within the corporation. This person would have assumed some of the
responsibilities of BBC staff in what would have amounted to an intra-institutional
exercise of authority by a scientist over BBC staff.
The ‘public domain’, the third domain referred to above, is where the media interact
with the general public in order to inform and inﬂuence. This domain is associated with
creation and maintenance of scientiﬁc authority outside the ‘republic of science’. Within
this domain, the scientist-manager at the BBC was expected not only to expand the
production of science broadcasts, but also to make them more didactic. This change of
style was designed to impress on the public the importance of science in their lives.
I drew attention during the narrative to the fundamentally differing conceptions of the
role of science broadcasting held by scientists and broadcasters. These differing
conceptions posed a threat to each party. They undermined the authority of the
scientists and the professional autonomy of the broadcasters. I wish to explore this idea
further, drawing on the work of Richard Whitley.
In relation to the scientiﬁc world, Whitley has identiﬁed a ‘traditional view’ of science
popularization favoured by scientists, and has listed some of its underlying assumptions
as follows. The audience is assumed to be passive and undifferentiated, rather than, for
example, heterogeneous, and possibly numbering scientists of various specialisms.113
Scientiﬁc knowledge is seen as produced by cohesive, autonomous communities of
scientists rather than by factions within a heterodox and sometimes rivalrous
profession.114 (Harrie Massey’s objection to the Third Programme’s covering topics
where scientists were in dispute comes to mind here.) Also, the assimilation of scientiﬁc
ideas by the public is construed as ‘a technical problem which can be surmounted by
increasing the general level of scientiﬁc training in the population’.115 These assumptions
are consistent with the arguments advanced by scientists during the interventions, and
also with the elitist authoritarian culture of Polanyi’s ‘republic of science’, where, for
example, internal divisions within science were not advertised externally and fromwhich
scientiﬁc authority was exercised over the lay public.
Broadcasters’ beliefs about science broadcasting, however, cut across the scientiﬁc
assumptions identiﬁed by Whitley. From the earliest days of broadcasting, BBC staff
conceived the audience as heterogeneous, and ideally as discriminating and not passive.
Listeners were expected to select their fare to suit their own recreational and educational
needs, and, in the ﬁrst couple of decades of the BBC, group listening followed by
discussions was encouraged, for which supplementary print material was sometimes
available. And although in the early years of the BBC general-interest talks were
often also instructional, by the 1950s and 1960s there was a clear distinction between
113 RichardWhitley, ‘Knowledge producers and knowledge acquirers’, in Terry Shinn and RichardWhitley
(eds.), Expository Science: Forms and Functions of Popularisation, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985, pp. 3–28, 4, 6.
114 Whitley, op. cit. (113), p. 120.
115 Whitley, op. cit. (113), p. 120.
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general-interest programmes and educational broadcasts. In his 1966 public lecture,
BBC producer Aubrey Singer underlined the non-didactic nature of general broadcast-
ing: ‘scientiﬁc programmes designed for a general audience are in no way directly
educational, still less instructive, in any formal sense. Rather they are designed to be
entertainingly informative at an intellectual level’.116
Indeed, the function of science popularization as generally understood by scientists –
the dissemination of scientiﬁc ﬁndings and the increase of general scientiﬁc knowledge –
was not at all the primary purpose of general-interest science broadcasts as far as BBC
staff were concerned. Singer summarizes the broadcasters’ view: ‘Understanding of a
scientiﬁc point is not essentially the most important thing for the audience to grasp’.117
Furthermore, for the broadcaster the primary focus was the audience, not science; the
purpose of science broadcasting ‘is not necessarily the propagation of science, rather its
aim is common with all broadcasting, an enrichment of the audience experience’.118
This broadcasting professional’s view of science had a long history in the BBC. For
instance Mary Adams, a science producer of the 1930s (and herself a scientist), doubted
the value of talks designed to dispense scientiﬁc knowledge to the public.119
The BBC’s jealous guardianship of its professional jurisdiction was framed by
Singer – in the manner usual to professionals – as serving the audience’s interests rather
than the broadcasters’:
We [broadcasters] place ourselves so that the inbuilt vested interests [of participants in
programmes] can be viewed as objectively as our own unconscious leanings of background and
upbringing will allow. To this end, as a foundation to our policy, we have ﬁrmly decided that
the broadcasting of science shall be in the hands of broadcasters.120
The broadcasters’ view of the nature of science broadcasting was consistent with the
culture it emanated from, just as the scientists’ view was consistent with the elitist
authoritarianism of institutional science. The BBC was not merely a public-service
broadcaster; it was also a culturally dominant institution. It had a monopoly on access to
the medium during a formative part of its history, a tradition of paternalism, an almost
universal reach within the UK, and a conviction that its own activities embodied ‘public
service’. But, as Burns says, the BBC was also ‘perpetually tensed against the pressures,
or the threat of pressures, from outside the Corporation’, and these external threats
partly accounted for a professional culture in which broadcasters created ‘an autistic
world out of their activities and beliefs’.121
Given the strength of the scientists’ grievances against the BBC, it is surprising that the
BBC’s imposed solution of a Science Consultative Group so effectively muted scientiﬁc
criticism. (However, the lack of archival evidence of scientiﬁc dissatisfaction with the
116 Singer, op. cit. (16), p. 14.
117 Singer, op. cit. (16), p. 14.
118 Singer, op. cit. (16), p. 9.
119 BBCWACR51/523/1, undated memo fromMary Adams to Ian Cox, probably June 1936. For more on
Mary Adams, an early luminary of BBC science production, see Allan Jones, ‘Mary Adams and the producer’s
role in early BBC science broadcasts’, Public Understanding of Science (2012) 21, pp. 968–983.
120 Singer, op. cit. (16), p. 8. Emphasis in the original.
121 Burns, op. cit. (8), p. 32.
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group should not be interpreted as evidence of satisfaction.) The Consultative Group,
though, by bringing scientists closer to BBC production staff, revealed two salient truths:
that the BBC’s science output was much greater than had been apparent from casual
listening and viewing, and that the BBC was not institutionally opposed to science,
whatever its reservations about elite scientiﬁc institutions. These points are well
illustrated by statistics from Aubrey’s Singer’s 1966 public lecture: there were
140 hours of science per year on radio and television, exclusive of the BBC’s School
broadcasting, Overseas broadcasting and Further Education output. In the latter
categories, television science output alone was 178 hours each year.122 Perhaps, though,
one BBC staff member had the shrewdest insight in suggesting that the effectiveness of
the Consultative Group lay in its moving the domain of interaction from the inter-
institutional to the interpersonal: Consultative Group members ‘have brought out into
the open the reality of the basically excellent relations that have always existed between
the producers of our science unit and the [scientiﬁc] operative, as distinct from the
hierarchical, scientiﬁc world’.123
122 Singer, op. cit. (16), pp. 10–11.
123 BBC WAC R6/239/3, memo from head of Talks and Current Affairs to programme editor, Arts, Sci &
Docs(s): editor, Science Talks(s), October 1965.
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